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Religion Behind Bars: Prison Litigation
Under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act in the Wake of Mack
v. O'Leary
I. Introduction
Freedom of religion has always been considered a fundamental
right in the United States.' Religious turmoil in seventeenth
century England caused a migration to the New World where
dissenters looked to America "as a place for carrying out colonial
experiments predicated on religious freedom."2 Maryland was the
first colony to attempt to foster religious toleration.3 Many of the
new states followed Maryland and included a religious freedom
clause in their state constitutions.' The national government also
recognized the importance of religious rights when framing the
United States Constitution.' This importance is clearly exemplified
by the First Amendment which states that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof."6
Since the enactment of the First Amendment to the Constitu-
tion, Congress has passed many laws designed to protect religious
1. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
2. ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAuSES 5
(1990).
3. See id. Maryland's Act Concerning Religion, passed in 1649, stated that no Christian
should "henceforth be any ways troubled, molested or discountenanced for or in respect of
his or her religion nor in the free exercise thereof.., nor any way compelled to the belief
or exercise of any other religion against his or her consent." Id
4. See id. at 9. Among those states were Virginia ("all men are equally entitled to the
free exercise of religion"), Pennsylvania ("all men have a natural and unalienable right to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences"), Delaware
(prohibiting the "establishment of any one religious sect in this State in preference to
another"), and New York (guaranteeing "the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference"). Id.
5. See id.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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freedom.7 In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act8 ("RFRA") in an effort to insure that religious
rights would not be abridged in schools, places of employment, and
prisons.9 Essentially, the Act states that the government may not
substantially burden a religious interest unless the government
establishes a compelling state interest and demonstrates that the
government action is the least restrictive means of achieving that
compelling interest. ° While religious groups embraced the Act,"
law enforcement and prison officials opposed the Act's application
to prisons. 2 Officials feared that prisoners would take advantage
of the Act and "wreak havoc in the nation's prisons. '13  Despite
the objections of law enforcement officials, Congress did include
prisons within the framework of RFRA, and such application
remained in effect until a few months ago when the Supreme Court
held RFRA unconstitutional."4
In enacting RFRA, Congress attempted to balance the
institutional needs and objectives of prisons with the provisions of
the Constitution.15 The Supreme Court has stated that "a prisoner
is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is
7. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination, on the basis of
religion, in the employment realm); 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a) (prohibiting religious discrimination
in residential real estate transactions); 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) (1994) (prohibiting an Indian tribe
from enforcing any law proscribing the free exercise of religion); 21 U.S.C. § 464 (1994)
(exempting from FDA regulations poultry or poultry products processed as required by
recognized religious dietary laws).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4.
9. See id. § 2000bb.
10. See id. § 2000bb(1)(b).
11. An unusual coalition of liberals, conservatives, and religious groups joined forces to
lobby for RFRA. This coalition included the National Association of Evangelicals, the
Southern Baptist Convention, the National Counsel of Churches, the American Jewish
Congress, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, the Mormon Church, the Traditional
Values Coalition, and the American Civil Liberties Union. See Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs
Boost for Religious Freedom: Liberals, Conservatives Back New Law, Hous. CHRoN., Nov.
17, 1993, available in 1993 WL 9633912.
12. See Michael Hirsley, Prisons Fear Law to Restore Religious Rights, CHi. TRIB., Aug.
1, 1993, at C1. Not all law enforcement officials, however, opposed the Act's application to
prisons. Attorney General Janet Reno supported the Act stating that activities jeopardizing
prison discipline would still be subject to prison regulation. See id.
13. Id. Opponents were concerned that any group could call itself a religion either to
avoid a prison regulation or to receive extra privileges. See id.
14. On June 25, 1997, the Supreme Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional. See
City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). The Court found that Congress exceeded
the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
at 2172.
15. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 1 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892.
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imprisoned for crime."' 6 Indeed, the Court has found "no iron
curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons." 7 The
fact that prisoners do retain constitutional rights, however, does not
imply that those rights are not subject to the restrictions imposed
by the nature of the prison regime." The Supreme Court has
established that "[1]awful incarceration brings about the necessary
withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights."1 9 The fact
of confinement necessarily imposes limitations on constitutional
rights including First Amendment rights.2° RFRA represented an
attempt by Congress to resolve the inevitable conflict that exists
between prisoners' rights, and the nature of the prison regime.
This comment will examine prison litigation under claims of
religious infringement. Part II will give a brief history of prisoner
claims of religious freedom before the passage of RFRA. Part III
will discuss the legislative history of RFRA and its application to
prisons. Part IV will analyze the Seventh Circuit's approach to
defining a substantial burden under RFRA in Mack v. O'Leary2
and examine Seventh Circuit cases following the Mack decision.
Finally, part V will look at narrower definitions of substantial
burden in the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and analyze
which definition is more appropriate in the prison context.
II. Brief History of Prisoner Claims of Religious Freedom
A. The "Hands-Off' Doctrine
Prior to the late 1960's, the courts responded to prisoner suits
with a "hands-off" doctrine that gave almost absolute deference to
prison administrators.' Basically, courts following this doctrine
refused to hear prisoners' complaints unless the case involved the
16. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (19"/3).
17. Id. at 555-56.
18. See id. at 556.
19. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
20. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoner's Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977).
21. 80 F.3d 1175 (7th Cir. 1996).
22. See HAZEL B. KERPER & JANEEN KERPER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONVICTED 278
(1974). The "hands-off' doctrine stated that "it is not the function of the courts to
superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries, but only to deliver




Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.'
Three justifications existed for the "hands-off" doctrine.'
The first justification regarded society's right to revenge.5 The
belief was that a prisoner forfeited not only his liberty "but all his
personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accord
to him."'  Second, courts were hesitant to "introduce possible
impediments into the correctional process."'27 The courts recog-
nized that they did not possess the knowledge necessary to run a
correctional institution.' Finally, the courts acknowledged that
the executive branch, not the judiciary, was responsible for the
prison system.29
Prisoners' claims of religious freedom did not escape the chill
of the "hands-off" doctrine. In Kelly v. Dowd," a prisoner
requested that he receive Bible study guides published by the
Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society.31 In dismissing the prison-
er's petition, the Seventh Circuit noted that prison officials were
"vested with a rather wide discretion in safekeeping and securing
prisoners committed to their custody."32 This discretion meant
that the acts of such officials would be upheld if they were
reasonably necessary to achieve the goals of confinement.33
Furthermore, the court stated that because the prisoner was
incarcerated in a state prison, the reasonableness of the warden's
23. See KERPER & KERPER, supra note 22, at 278.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. Id. (quoting Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 21 Gratt. 790 (Va. Ct. App. 1871)).
27. Id.
28. See KERPER & KERPER, supra note 22, at 278. The Supreme Court itself recognized
that courts were "ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison
administration and reform." Jones v. North Carolina Prisoner's Union, 433 U.S. 119, 126
(1977) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974)).
29. See KERPER & KERPER, supra note 22, at 279. The Eighth Circuit, for example,
noted that "Congress has vested the care, custody, control, treatment and discipline of
persons confined in the penal institutions of the United States in the Bureau of Prisons under
the general supervision of the Attorney General. In the administration of this authority
given them, the courts may not interfere." Sutton v. Settle, 302 F.2d 286, 288 (8th Cir. 1962).
30. 140 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1944).
31. See id. at 82.




refusal to provide religious materials must be determined by state
courts.34
The New York Supreme Court of Wyoming County also used
the "hands-off" doctrine to dismiss a prisoner's claim of religious
freedom. In People v. Wilkins, 3 a prisoner claimed that he was
denied religious freedom under the First Amendment by a prison
regulation that prohibited the prisoner from taking an Arabic
grammar book into the prison's recreational yard.36 In denying
the prisoner's petition, the court found that "[t]he question as to
what materials ... are permitted... in the prison recreational yard
or elsewhere in the prison is a matter of prison discipline entrusted
by the Legislature to the Department of Corrections and the
Warden of the prison."37
Although the "hands-off" doctrine made the courts' work
easier, several serious consequences resulted.38 The most serious
consequence was that potentially worthy complaints were never
heard in court.39 In addition, prison officials had little incentive
to improve prison conditions.' As a result of these consequences,
the belief that the courts should stay out of prison affairs began to
lose appeal." The courts were recognized as experts on constitu-
tional law, and invalidation of a prison regulation involved
constitutional issues. 42  The courts rarely, if ever, would need to
assume management of a prison.43 As a result, the harsh doctrine
began to fade in the late 1960's just as courts, in general, began to
recognize more individual rights."
34. See id. According to the Seventh Circuit, "[w]hether a state warden... has adopted
regulations or performed acts which... deprive [an inmate] of what prisoners are permitted
to enjoy under the statutes, are questions... to be determined in the first instance by the
courts of the state." I&
35. 210 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
36. See id. at 310. The prisoner maintained that the grammar book was used to study
the Arabic language which advanced his Islamic religious faith. See id
37. 1d.





43. See GOBERT & COHEN, supra note 38, at 8.
44. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding police officers must
inform suspects of their rights before interrogation); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) (holding that wherever an individual may be, one is entitled to know that he/she will
remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972) (holding that no person may be imprisoned for any offense unless represented by
1997]
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B. A Split in the 1970's
In 1974, the Supreme Court announced the demise of the
"hands-off" doctrine in Procunier v. Martinez4' by proclaiming
that the "hands-off" doctrine ended where the restriction of
constitutional rights began.' The demise of the "hands-off"
doctrine led the courts to apply several different approaches in
addressing religious freedom in prisons. 47  One approach was to
apply a reasonableness test. The Fifth Circuit used such a test in
Brooks v. Wainwright." Here, the court found that a prison
shaving regulation did not violate the First Amendment.49 The
court stated that "where the state regulation is neither unreason-
able nor arbitrary, the courts will not interfere with the administra-
tive functions of state prisons."5 The Third Circuit also took this
approach in O'Malley V. Brierley.5 In upholding the prisoner's
claims, the court stated "that where a state does afford prison
inmates the opportunity of practicing a religion, it may not, without
reasonable justification, curtail the practice of religion by one
sect.
,5 2
Another approach, evidenced by the Eighth Circuit's choice in
Moore v. Ciccone,53 was to apply a balancing test. In Moore, an
inmate claimed that the prison had abridged his free exercise of
religion.54 In upholding the claim, the court found that when a
prison regulation allegedly infringes upon a constitutional right, "a
court must balance the asserted need for the regulation in further-
counsel).
45. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
46. The Supreme Court stated: "[J]udicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take
cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state institution.
When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal
courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights." Id. at 405-06.
47. See GOBERT & COHEN, supra note 38, at 151.
48. Brooks v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1970).
49. See id. at 653.
50. Id. at 653.
51. 477 F.2d 785 (3d Cir. 1973) (involving an action by clergymen and inmates who
claimed their First Amendment rights were abridged when prison officials withdrew from the
clergymen previously granted privileges to conduct religious services and counseling within
the prison).
52. Id- at 795.
53. 459 F.2d 574, 576 (8th Cir. 1972).
54. See id. at 575. The inmate alleged that incoming mail from his attorney and
religious advisors had been subject to official delay, censorship, and reading. See id
[Vol. 101:4
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ing prison security ... against the claimed constitutional right., 51
The Supreme Court also took this view in Bell v. Wolfish.56 The
opinion stated that the role of the reviewing court is to balance
"the significant and legitimate security interests of the institution
against the privacy interests of the inmates.,
57
A final approach used by the courts was the strict scrutiny test.
In Safley v. Turner,58 the Eighth Circuit applied a strict scrutiny
test in invalidating prison regulations regarding mail and mar-
riage.59 The court held that rights, which are consistent with
imprisonment, are afforded the highest level of protection under
the First Amendment, and their alleged deprivation requires a strict
scrutiny analysis.6° Thus, the regulation would be upheld only if
the government demonstrated a compelling interest and established
that the regulation was narrowly tailored to effectuate that
interest.61 The court found the mail regulation was not "presump-
tively dangerous nor inherently inconsistent with legitimate
penalogical [sic] objectives., 62 Regarding the marriage regulation,
the court held that the state's interest in preventing "love triangles"
was neither compelling nor was the regulation the least restrictive
means of achieving any governmental interest.'
The Sixth Circuit also used a strict scrutiny test but dismissed
the prisoner's civil rights complaint in Martin v. Kelley.64 The
court held that prison regulations that were not "narrowly tailored
to meet the articulated governmental interest involved" violated the
First Amendment. 65 In upholding the regulation in Martin, the
court found that the regulation furthered the important governmen-
55. Id. at 576 (quoting Smith v. Robbins, 328 F. Supp. 162, 164 (D. Me. 1971)).
56. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
57. Id. at 560. The Court reversed the district court's finding of several constitutional
violations in a New York prison. See id. The Court found that the interests of the prison
outweighed those of the inmates. See id. at 560-61.
58. 777 F.2d 1307 (8th Cir. 1985).
59. See id. at 1312, 1315. The challenged regulations consisted of a restriction on
marriage, which effectively prohibited such marriages by inmates, and a restriction on non-
family and inmate-to-inmate mail. See id at 1308-09.
60. See id at 1311.
61. See id. at 1312-13.
62. Id. at 1313.
63. Safley, 777 F.2d at 1315.
64. 803 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1986) (relating to an inmate's challenge of a prison regulation
regarding the censorship of incoming mail).
65. Id. at 242.
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tal interests of prison security and order; furthermore, the regula-
tion was narrowly tailored to meet those governmental interests. 6
C. Supreme Court Resolution
The courts continued to apply different standards which often
led to disparate treatment of claims. In 1987, the Supreme Court
finally appeared to resolve the issue in O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz.67  In O'Lone, Islamic prisoners challenged prison
regulations that prevented them from attending Jumu'ah, a weekly
Muslim service.68  The district court found no constitutional
violation.69 The court rejected the strict scrutiny test in the prison
context and stated that prison officials need show only that a
"potential danger" to security existed.7' The burden then shifted
to the prisoner to demonstrate that the officials' security concerns
are exaggerated.71 Although the officials in O'Lone could have
imposed less restrictive alternatives, the movement of inmates from
outside work jobs to the inside religious service was a potential
security danger.
7 2
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the district
court's decision and remanded the case for further consideration.73
The court stated that the regulations could be upheld only if the
state showed that the "regulations were intended to serve, and do
serve, the important penological goal of security, and that no
reasonable method exists by which [the prisoner's] rights can be
66. See id.
67. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
68. See id. at 345. Jumu'ah, which is commanded by the Koran, must be held every
Friday after the sun reaches its zenith and before afternoon prayer. See id.
The challenged prison regulations required inmates assigned to outside work to remain
outside all day. See id. at 346. The purpose of the regulations was to maintain order. Since
only one guard supervised the work, when one inmate wanted to go inside during the day
(to attend services, for example), the entire group of eight to fifteen inmates had to return.
See id at 346. The regulations prevented the chaos that resulted from moving prisoners in
and out of the facility. The inmates, however, alleged that the regulation denied them their
free exercise rights under the First Amendment. See id at 347.
69. See Shabazz v. O'Lone, 595 F. Supp. 928,934 (D. NJ. 1984), rev'd, 782 F.2d 416 (3d
Cir. 1986), rev'd, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
70. Id. at 933. The court noted that prison officials do not have to show the restriction
would in fact be detrimental to penological objectives. See id.
71. See id at 934.
72. See id.
73. See Shabazz v. O'Lone, 782 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1986).
[Vol. 101:4
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accommodated without creating bona fide security problems."'74
The court of appeals rejected the test applied by the district court
because that standard provided inadequate protection of prisoners'
First Amendment rights.7" On certiorari, the Supreme Court
reversed the Third Circuit and upheld the district court's deci-
76sion.
In O'Lone, the Supreme Court declared that a prison regula-
tion alleged to infringe constitutional rights would be upheld if it
was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.' In
reaching that conclusion, the Court recognized that while prisoners
do not give up all constitutional rights upon entering a prison, the
fact of incarceration does limit the exercise of those rights. 78 The
Court found that the rational basis test was the best approach
because it permitted correctional officials to adopt "innovative
solutions" to the problems of prison administration. 79 Finally, the
Court reaffirmed its "refusal, even where claims are made under
the First Amendment, to 'substitute [its] judgment on... difficult
and sensitive matters of institutional administration' for the
determinations of those charged with the formidable task of
running a prison."' The O'Lone reasonableness test remained in
effect until RFRA was passed in 1993.
74. 1& at 420. The court also held, however, that while due weight should be given to
the testimony of prison officials, such testimony is not conclusive. See id. Where a
reasonable method of accommodation can be adopted, the state may not interfere with the
free exercise of religion. See id.
75. See id. at 417. The court found that the standard used by the district court did not
require an analysis of the possibility of accommodating prisoners' religious practices. See id.
at 420.
76. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 342 (1987).
77. See id at 349. See also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 79 (1987). The Court stated
that regulations would be "judged under a 'reasonableness' test less restrictive than that
ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights." O'Lone,
482 U.S. at 349. In this case, the Court found that prison officials acted in a reasonable
manner and that the regulation was reasonably related to the institutional interests in order
and security. See id. at 350. In addition, the Court found that the penological goal of
rehabilitation could be met by requiring inmates to show up for a full day of work. See id.
at 351. Finally, the Court found it significant that the inmates had opportunities to attend
other Muslim services. See id. at 352.
78. See id. at 348.
79. Id. at 349-50.
80. Id. at 353 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 588 (1984)).
1997]
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III. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
A. Legislative History
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA")
was introduced to Congress in March 1993." This was not the
first time, however, that RFRA had been introduced. The Act was
first introduced in the House of Representatives in July 1990.'
The purpose of that bill was to protect the free exercise of
religion. 3 Thus, the government could not restrict any person's
free exercise of religion unless (1) the restriction was generally
applicable,8' (2) the restriction did not intentionally discriminate
against religion, 5 and (3) the government demonstrated the
regulation was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
state interest. 6 Congress, however, did not enact this version of
RFRA. Another failed attempt to enact RFRA occurred in
1991.8
81. See H.R. 1308, 103d Cong. (1993) (enacted); S. 578, 103d Cong. (1993) (enacted).
82. See H.R. 5377, 101st Cong. (1990).
83. See id.
84. Seeki
85. See id. The actual text reads: "(b) LAWS OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY-A
governmental authority may restrict any person's free exercise of religion only if-
(1) the restriction-
(A) is in the form of a rule of general applicability; and
(B) does not intentionally discriminate against religion, or among religions." Id.
86. See id. The actual text requires that: "(2) the governmental authority demonstrates
that application of the restriction to the person-
(A) is essential to further a compelling governmental interest; and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest."
Ma.
87. The Senate also introduced a similar version of RFRA on October 26, 1990, but it
was not enacted. See S. 3524, 101st Cong. (1990).
88. The House of Representatives introduced House Bill 2797 on June 26, 1991. The
bill stated:
SEC. 3. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION PROTECTED.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Government shall not burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as
provided in subsection (b).
(b) EXCEPTION.-Government may burden a person's exercise of religion
only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-
(1) is essential to further a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
H.R. 2797, 102d Cong. (1991). A similar bill failed in the Senate. See S. 2969, 102d Cong.
(1991).
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The 1993 Act was enacted by the Senate on October 27, 1993
and by the House of Representatives on November 3, 1993.89 The
Act states that "[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability."'  The Act, however, provides for an
exception when the government shows that it has a compelling
state interest and that the government has used the least restrictive
means to achieve that interest.9' The Act was made applicable to
any "branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official" of
the federal or any state government. 2 Thus, the Act applied to
all correctional institutions.
Congress' disagreement with the Supreme Court's decision in
Employment Division v. Smith93 spurred the passage of RFRA.
Smith involved an Oregon law that prohibited the knowing or
intentional possession of a controlled substance including the
hallucinogenic drug peyote.94 The plaintiffs were members of the
Native American Church whose religious practices included the
sacramental use of peyote.95 The plaintiffs were fired from their
jobs after ingesting peyote during a religious ceremony.96 Subse-
quently, the Employment Division of the Department of Human
Resources of Oregon denied unemployment benefits to the
plaintiffs.' The plaintiffs claimed that the law's application
violated their right to the free exercise of religion and urged the
Supreme Court to use a compelling interest test.98 The Supreme
Court rejected the compelling interest test and held that neutral,
generally applicable laws that burden religion are not subject to any
89. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 1 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (1994).
91. See id. § 2000bb-l(b). The text states: "(b) Exception. Government may
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application
of the burden to the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."
id.
92. Id. § 2000bb-2(1).
93. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
94. See OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1995). The law provided that violators would be
guilty of a Class B felony. See id.
95. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 872. It should be noted, however, that the Native American
Church forbids the nonreligious use of peyote. See id. at 914.
96. See id. at 874.
97. See id. The Employment Division denied compensation because the plaintiffs had
been discharged for work-related misconduct. See id.
98. See id. at 875-76.
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special justification.99 The Court reasoned that the applicability
of the law was better left to the political process."° In addition,
the Court feared that adoption of the compelling interest test
"would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious
exemptions from civic obligations of every conceivable kind." '
Congress believed that the Smith decision would cause every
religion in America to suffer." 2 To avoid this result and to
assure that all Americans were free to exercise their religious
beliefs without governmental interference, Congress found that
legislation was required to implement the compelling interest
test. 3 In proposing the compelling interest test, Congress relied
on the Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner.1O In
Sherbert, the Court stated that if the government places a burden
on the free exercise of religion,0" the government must show that
it used the least restrictive means available to achieve a compelling
state interest.' °6 Congress noted that the purpose of the Bill of
Rights was to establish religious freedom as a legal principle,
beyond the reach of majorities and officials."° Thus, Congress
included the compelling interest test in RFRA to reflect "the First
99. See id at 879. The Court stated that "the right of free exercise does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability
on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes)."' Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
100. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (noting that several states had exempted religious use of
peyote from criminal drug laws).
101. Id. at 888. The Court believed that the compelling interest test would lead to
religious exemptions in military service, payment of taxes, health and safety standards, and
laws relating to racial equality. See id. at 889.
102. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 8 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892. Congress
looked at the impact of Smith and found that in some cases, churches have been zoned out
of commercial areas. See id. In addition, Jews have been subjected to autopsies in violation
of the Jewish faith. See id.
103. See id.
104. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The plaintiff in Sherbert challenged a state law requiring all
persons seeking unemployment compensation to be available to work everyday of the week
except Sunday. See id. The plaintiff was a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church
which recognizes Saturday as the Sabbath. See id.
105. See id. at 404. The Court stated that such a burden could be direct or indirect. See
id.
106. See id. at 403. The Court asserted that the interest must be more than a mere
"rational relationship to some colorable state interest." Id. at 406.
107. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 8. Indeed, "[o]ne's rights to... freedom of worship...
may not be submitted to vote." Id. (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
[Vol. 101:4
RELIGION BEHIND BARS
Amendment's mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest
extent possible in pluralistic society."'"
B. Application of RFRA to Prisons
Considerable opposition, mostly from law enforcement
officials, arose in response to the Act's application to prisons."
Senator Harry Reid, a Republican from Nevada, introduced an
amendment to RFRA that would have prevented application of the
Act to individuals in federal, state, and local correctional institu-
tions. 10 Senator Reid feared that the compelling interest test
would encourage prisoners to file more suits and, thus, tie up the
court system."' Senator Reid asserted that the amendment
merely maintained the Supreme Court's standard in O'Lone."
Senator Alan Simpson, a Republican from Wyoming, also
expressed concern that RFRA would increase inmate litigation and
make it difficult for the courts to quickly dismiss frivolous or
undeserving inmate challenges. ' 3 In addition, he feared that
government prosecutors would be diverted from criminal prosecu-
tions. 4 Furthermore, there was a fear that inmates would learn
to create "religions" just to obtain special benefits or to avoid
certain prison regulations.15  Senator Simpson urged that the
O'Lone reasonableness test was more appropriate than a compel-
ling interest test in the prison context."6 Finally, Senator Simp-
son argued that the amendment introduced by Senator Reid was
108. Id (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 903 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
109. See Hirsley, supra note 12, at Cl (discussing law enforcement officials' campaign
against RFRA); Henry Bayer, Religion in Prison, CI. TRIm., Oct. 27, 1993, at N16
(maintaining that passage of the Act would only compound the problem of excessive
litigation and increase cost of operations).
110. See 139 CONG. REC. 14,461 (1993).
111. See itt at 14,468. Senator Reid stated that under the compelling interest test, judges
would no longer be able to dismiss frivolous suits by summary judgment. See it Instead,
full evidentiary hearings would be necessary. Senator Reid felt this increased burden
constituted an unfunded mandate on the states. See id.
112. See id
113. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 18 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892.
114. See id. at 19. The Senator Simpson stated that "[als the civil caseload increases, the
number of criminal prosecutions will fall." Id
115. See id at 20. Senator Simpson referred to cases brought by prisoners to obtain the
services of prostitutes, to own and use nunchucks, and to have a special diet of organically
grown produce washed in distilled water. See id
116. See id at 23 ("Prisons are, by their very nature, designed to be closed societies.
Within these closed societies, there must be rules to protect all within the prison walls.").
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more faithful to the approach the Supreme Court had previously
taken with respect to prisons.
1 7
Senator Reid's amendment did not garner enough support
from other members of Congress;.. however, the Committee on
the Judiciary did consider the concerns of Senators Reid and
Simpson."9 In reference to the Act's application to prisons, the
Committee Report states that the purpose of RFRA is to "restore
traditional protection afforded to prisoners' claims prior to O'Lone,
not to impose a more rigorous standard than the one that was
applied."1 " The Committee stated that the Act was not intended
to place undue burdens on prison authorities."' In addition, the
Committee expressly stated that the courts must continue to give
deference to the experience and expertise of correctional officials
in establishing regulations designed to maintain security and
discipline, consistent with a consideration of the limited resources
available." The Committee concluded that it was unnecessary
to exempt prisons from the Act because the Act itself permitted
courts to balance the legitimate interests of prison officials with the
history of protecting the free exercise of religion." Thus, the
Committee did recognize that claims inside prison walls are
different from claims outside the prison. This difference required
that deference be given to prison officials under RFRA.
IV. The Seventh Circuit
A. Mack v. O'Leary and the Meaning of Substantial Burden
One area of controversy in prison litigation under RFRA was
the definition of "substantial burden." RFRA did not define what
constitutes a substantial burden. Thus, the courts were left to
117. See id. ("[T]he reasonableness standard has been applied by the Supreme Court for
all other First Amendment challenges in the prison context [and]... the Court has refused
to apply the very standard [RFRA] seeks to apply.").
118. See 139 CONG. REc. 14,468 (1993). The amendment was defeated 58 to 41. See i.
In July 1995, Senator Reid attempted once again to exempt prisons from RFRA. See S.
1093, 104th Cong. (1995). The bill was pending referral to the Judiciary Committee when
the Supreme Court struck down RFRA. See id.
119. See generally S. REP. No. 103-111 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892.
120. Id. at 10.
121. See id at 11.
122. See id at 10. The Committee also noted, however, that a prison regulation
grounded on "mere speculation, exaggerated fears, or post-hoc rationalizations" would not
meet the requirements of RFRA. Id.
123. See id. at 11.
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define the term. Some courts defined substantial burden very
narrowly while others opted for a broader definition." The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit chose the broader defini-
tion.1"
The Seventh Circuit recently examined the issue of substantial
burden."2  In Mack v. O'Leary, a Muslim prisoner filed suit
against prison officials for alleged infringements of his right to
celebrate the religious holiday of Ramadan.1" The prisoner
asserted that prison officials violated RFRA by substantially
burdening his free exercise of religion."2  The district court
dismissed the action holding that the complaint failed to allege facts
sufficient to establish a violation of the prisoner's rights.129 The
court found that prison officials made a reasonable effort to
accommodate the prisoner's needs during Ramadan. 3 ' Although
the prison regulations interfered with the desired method of prayer,
the court held that the regulations did not interfere with the
prisoner's "ability to retain and worship the principle that is central
to Islam."13'
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, considering for
the first time the meaning of "substantial burden," reversed.'
1
The court examined narrow definitions of the term that define
substantial burden as one interfering with conduct expressly
required or forbidden by one's religion.133 The court also looked
at broader definitions which define a substantial burden as one that
interferes with conduct that is "religiously motivated" or central to
124. See discussion infra Part V.A.
125. See Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1175 (7th Cir. 1996). See also discussion infra
Part IV.B.
126. See Mack, 80 F.3d at 1175.
127. See Mack v. O'Leary, No. 94-C621, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156, at *1 (N.D. Il. Jan.
9, 1995), rev'd, 80 F.3d 1175 (7th Cir. 1996). Ramadan is a 30 day period during which
fasting is required. See id
128. See id. The prisoner alleged that he was forced to pray in the cafeteria without
running water to purify his body. See id. Prison officials did, however, permit the inmate
to purify himself in his cell before going to the cafeteria. See id.
129. See id. at *9.
130. See id. The court noted that the inmate was able to purify himself in his cell and
was permitted to worship and pray in the cafeteria. See id.
131. Id. at *10.
132. See Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1181 (7th Cir. 1996).
133. See id. at 1178.
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one's religious beliefs."M The court decided on a very broad and
generous definition of substantial burden. 35 Thus, the court held:
[A] substantial burden on the free exercise of religion... is one
that forces adherents of a religion to refrain from religiously
motivated conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or expression
that manifests a central tenet of a person's religious beliefs, or
compels conduct or expression that is contrary to those
beliefs..36
In rejecting a narrower definition, the court stated that the
broad definition was "[m]ore faithful both to the statutory language
and to the approach that the courts took before" the passage of
RFRA.37 Furthermore, the court found a broader definition was
"more sensitive to religious feeling" and avoided the "undesirability
of making judges arbiters of religious law."" Under the broader
definition, the court held that the courts could use common
knowledge to determine whether conduct is religiously motivat-
ed.139 In addition, the court noted that many religious practices,
while not mandatory, are still very important to their believers who
consider the denial of such practices an infringement on their
religious freedom." Therefore, the Seventh Circuit remanded
the case for a determination of whether the practices in question
were important to the inmate's religious beliefs.
14 1
B. Seventh Circuit Cases After Mack v. O'Leary
Two cases brought by prisoners under RFRA have come
before the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit since the
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. Md at 1179. Basically, the court held that a substantial burden exists when a prison
regulation forbids an inmate from participating in conduct that the inmate feels is important
to his religious beliefs. See id.
137. Mack, 80 F.3d at 1178 (stating that the definition was in line with the Supreme
Court's approach in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
138. Id. at 1179. The court stated that the narrower definition would require an
examination into religious dogma. See i While this examination may be feasible in
hierarchical religions, such as Catholicism, it would be impossible in non-hierarchical
religions, such as Islam. See id.
139. See i
140. See id. For example, praying the rosary is not mandatory to Roman Catholics. In
addition, the wearing of yarmulkes is not required by the Orthodox Jewish faith. See id
141. See id. at 1180.
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decision in Mack v. O'Leary.4 2 In Sasnett v. Sullivan, a group of
state prisoners in Wisconsin brought a suit challenging a prison
regulation that prohibited the wearing of jewelry.43 The inmates
claimed the regulation violated RFRA because it prohibited them
from wearing crucifixes. 4 The district court held that application
of the regulation constituted a substantial burden. 45 Although
the wearing of a cross was not required by the inmate's religion,
the district court found that the practice was important to the
inmates and was "religiously motivated."' 6
The Seventh Circuit affirmed holding that, under the definition
of substantial burden announced in Mack, the regulation violated
RFRA. 47 Although Christianity does not require wearing a
crucifix, it is a central symbol to many of the faith."4 In addition,
the court agreed with the lower court that the wearing of a cross
was indeed "religiously motivated."'49  Thus, the prohibition
constituted a substantial burden on the inmate's religious freedom
under RFRA.'" The court of appeals also held that the govern-
ment had not carried its burden of establishing a compelling state
interest and demonstrating that the regulation was narrowly
tailored to that interest.'51 Although crosses could be filed down
and made into weapons, the court found that the state's interest in
safety was not compelling. 52 However, the court conceded that
142. See Cubero v. Burtin, No. 96-1494, 1990 WL508624 (7th Cir. Sept. 3, 1996)
(unpublished opinion); Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1996).
143. See Sasneut, 91 F.3d at 1019. The regulation forbade "the possession of items which
because of shape or configuration are apt to cause a laceration if applied to the skin with
force." Id Prison officials had refused to make an exception for religious jewelry unless the
jewelry was made of cloth. See id
144. See id.
145. See Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429 (W.D. Wis. 1995). Although the district
court's opinion was issued before Mack, the court did apply the broader "religiously
motivated" definition. See hi at 1444.
146. See id at 1445. The court based it decision on testimony from the inmates that they
were reminded of their faith and felt closer to God when wearing a cross. See id. The
inmates, however, also testified that they were still Christians when not wearing the cross.
See id
147. See Sasnett, 91 F.3d at 1022.
148. See id.
149. See id at 1022.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See Sasnett, 91 F.3d at 1023. The court noted, however, that if certain types of
jewelry posed a "genuine threat" to security, the state may ban them. Id.
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the state could restrict crosses by size or weight so as to prevent the
making of sharp objects. 53
The second case, Cubero v. Burton, 4 involved a suit brought
by Native American prisoners who claimed that prison officials had
interfered with their right of religion under RFRA.55 The
inmates claimed that the state interfered by denying them religious
materials, by denying them permission to "smudge" '156 in their
rooms, and by temporarily closing a sweat lodge 57 at the pris-
on. 58 Because the sweat lodge was open at the time of trial, and
prison officials did allow inmates to smudge in their cell when
inmates first transferred to their cell, the only issue before the court
was whether the prison officials' refusal to purchase religious
materials constituted a substantial burden.'59 The district court
granted summary judgment on behalf of the prison and the court
of appeals affirmed. 6
The court of appeals appeared to base its decision on econom-
ics. While the denial of religious materials was a substantial
burden, the state's interest in maintaining safety and order in
prisons was compelling.61  Traditionally, much deference has
been given to the state when it comes to allocation of funds.62
The prison system has never provided inmates with more than the
necessities of life-food, clothing and shelter.1"' For example, a
prison does not purchase cigarettes for prisoners. The reason is
that prisons are only given a certain amount of money from the
153. See id. The prison regulation, however, did permit prisoners to wear crosses made
out of cloth. See id at 1019. Therefore, one could conclude that the government had used
the least restrictive means in achieving a compelling interest in prison security.
154. No. 96-1494, 1996 WL 508624, at *1 (7th Cir. Sept. 3, 1996).
155. See Ad.
156. Id. "Smudging" involves the purifying of an inmate's cell "before prayers by
burning a mixture of age, sweet grass, tobacco, cedar, and other herbs." Id. Due to a "no
smoking" policy, prison officials stated that smudging could take place only when an inmate
first transferred to the cell. See id.
157. See id. A sweat lodge ceremony takes place in a tent-like structure. Heated rocks
are placed in the center of the lodge and participants pour hot water on the rocks to create
steam. This steam causes the participants to sweat, purifying their bodies. See Hamilton v.
Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1548 (8th Cir. 1996).
158. See Cubero, 1996 WL 508624, at *1
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id. at *2.
162. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987).
163. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
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state.'6' If prison officials bought materials for the prisoners in
Cubero, other religious groups would make similar demands." s
The important part of the Cubero decision, however, is that
although the state did not have to purchase the materials for the
religious ceremony, the court intimated that if the prisoners
purchased the materials themselves, the state would be required to
provide a sweat lodge.' 66
V. Analysis
A. Substantial Burden in Other Circuits
Many other circuits have decided to apply a narrower
definition of "substantial burden." These courts define a substan-
tial burden as one that compels individuals to engage in conduct
proscribed by their religious beliefs or prohibits individuals from
engaging in conduct that their religion requires.167 Therefore, a
government action must place so much pressure on an adherent
that one modifies his/her behavior and violates his/her religious
beliefs."6 With this approach, a substantial burden must be more
than a mere inconvenience to the individual.169
By applying a narrower definition of substantial burden, the
Ninth Circuit was able to dismiss a prisoner's claim under RFRA
in Bryant v. Gomez.7 In that case, a Pentecostal prisoner sought
to compel prison officials to provide him with a full Pentecostal
service.17' The court of appeals upheld summary judgment for
the prison stating that the prisoner had not shown that Pentecostal
practices, such as speaking in tongues and laying on hands, were
required by his faith."7 Although those practices might be
164. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
165. See generally id (explaining the ripple effect of allocating funds for certain uses).
166. See Cubero, 1996 WL 508624, at *2. Prison officials had briefly closed down the
sweat lodge for repairs; the court justified the temporary closing on safety reasons. See id.
The court did, however, suggest that a sweat lodge is required to be on the prison premises.
See id.
167. See Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 1995); Bryant v.
Gomez, 46 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1995); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995).
168. See Goodall, 60 F.3d at 172.
169. See Bryant, 46 F.3d at 949.
170. Id at 948.
171. See id. The prison did provide an "inter-faith" Christian service and a Pentecostal
volunteer who attended Bible study classes that focused more specifically on the beliefs of
the Pentecostal faith. See id. at 949-50.
172. See id. at 949.
19971
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
unique to the Pentecostal faith, no evidence existed that the inmate
was prohibited from engaging in conduct required by his reli-
gion.173 Furthermore, the inmate did not demonstrate that he
could not accomplish the mandates of his religion through services
the prison did provide. 74
If the Bryant case had been set in the Seventh Circuit, the
outcome probably would have been different. Under the Seventh
Circuit's definition of substantial burden, one must show only that
the prison regulation interferes with conduct that an inmate feels
is important to his/her religious beliefs. 75 Although the unique
characteristics mentioned above are not required by the Pentecostal
faith, they are clearly important to the prisoner's faith. Thus, the
Seventh Circuit would have upheld Bryant's claim.
B. A Narrower Definition is a Better Choice in the Prison
Context
Prison officials experienced an "explosion" of prisoner lawsuits
under RFRA 76 Since 1993, prison officials have been faced with
thousands of lawsuits brought by inmates on religious grounds.'"
The fears of Senator Reid and other opponents of RFRA's
application to prisons have been realized. Prisoner lawsuits are
diverting the attention of prosecutors. In 1993, prisoners filed more
than 53,000 lawsuits; the government fied only around 46,000
against criminals. 78 In addition, prosecutors have been forced to
relitigate cases previously won under the reasonableness stan-
dard.
79
- Furthermore, prisoners took advantage of RFRA to conceal
criminal activity. In a District of Columbia correctional institution,
a gang of bogus priests took prostitutes and drugs to inmates under
the guise of a spiritual visit."m The inmates were permitted to
173. See i
174. See Bryant, 46 F.3d at 949.
175. See Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1178 (7th Cir. 1996).
176. Phil Davis, Law Opens Door to Prison Suits; Act Gives Legal Protection to Members
of All Religious Groups, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Apr. 26, 1995, at 9A.
177. See id. In Florida alone, the Attorney General's office is handling two dozen
religious freedom lawsuits filed by prisoners. See id
178. See Discouraging Lawsuits, TIMES-PIcAYUNE (New Orleans), Mar. 5, 1995, at B6.
179. See Davis, supra note 176, at 9A.
180. See Hugh Davies, Bogus Priests Held Prison Sex Romps, DAiLY TELEGRAPH
(Washington, D.C.), Sept. 28, 1996, at 14.
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have unsupervised "spiritual visits" under RFRA."' Prison
officials allowed unsupervised visits for fear that any slight intrusion
would violate RFRA.' 2
Recently, the Supreme Court found that Congress exceeded its
constitutional power in enacting RFRA.' Although the federal
Act is no longer valid, many states have or plan to enact similar
state versions of RFRA. Now, the state courts must struggle
with which definition of "substantial burden" to apply in the prison
context. The rights of prisoners are not totally abandoned upon
incarceration. Yet, the courts cannot forget that "people in prison
are different from people in free society. ... [P]eople come to
prisons against their will. Prison presumes some inconven-
iences.
, 185
The narrower definition of substantial burden is more
appropriate in the prison context. As demonstrated in the Bryant
case, the narrower definition allows the courts to dismiss a claim
that does not allege a burden on a required belief. Thus, the courts
can dismiss frivolous claims and claims brought by bogus religious
groups before money and time are spent on a trial. The narrower
definition is also more faithful to Congress' intent." The legisla-
tive history expressly states that deference is to be given to prison
administrators.187
In addition, the narrower definition is consistent with the
courts' history of dealing with religious claims in prison. Until the
1960's, the courts would not even look at a claim of religious
infringement. When courts did begin to look at such claims, they
did so under a variety of tests including the rational basis test."
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997).
184. See Lyle Denniston, High Court Upsets Religious Freedom Law; Congress Cannot
Create New Constitutional Rights, 6-3 Majority Says, BALTIMORE SuN, June 26, 1997, at 3A
(stating that a Baltimore delegate plans to introduce a religious freedom measure next year);
Roger K. Lowe & Jonathan Riskind, Religion Measure Quashed, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June
26, 1997, at 1A (reporting that Ohio Attorney General Betty D. Montgomery "will ask the
Ohio General Assembly to adopt a state religious freedom law without the problems
associated with the federal bill"); Peggy Fletcher Stack, High Court Slaps Down Religion Act;
Ruling Imperils Liberties of Everyone, Critics Say, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, June 26, 1997, at
Al (confirming Massachusetts and Minnesota have enacted state religious freedom laws).
185. Hirsley, supra note 12, at Cl.
186. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 44 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892.
187. See id.
188. See supra Part I.A.
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The Supreme Court in O'Lone stated that a prisoner's claims of
religious infringement were to be analyzed under the rational basis
test."s  When the Supreme Court recently held that Congress
exceeded its powers in enacting RFRA, it stated that it is the
Court's precedent that must control the level of religious freedom
that the Constitution provides."l On the issue of religious
freedom in the prison context, the Court's precedent in O'Lone
clearly asserts that prison regulations are subject to a rational basis
test and not a strict scrutiny test.91
Furthermore, one of the goals of the criminal justice system is
deterrence. If prisons are seen as hotels or country clubs where
officials cater to a prisoner's every wish and desire, potential
criminals will not be deterred by the thought of going to prison.
Prisoners are placed in correctional institutions because they have
violated society's laws. Prison funds should be used for programs
designed to rehabilitate prisoners so that they may eventually re-
enter society. Funds should not be used to reward prisoners who
use religion to receive extra privileges or to avoid necessary
regulations.
By requiring only a showing that the belief is important to the
prisoner or is religiously motivated, the Seventh Circuit has opened
itself up to increased frivolous litigation and to increased criminal
activity under the guise of "religious conduct." Any group can call
itself a religious organization and demand privileges because the
group's practices are important. The broader definition of
substantial burden gives deference to the prisoner by allowing, in
effect, the creation of one's own religious beliefs. This definition
is not faithful to Congress' intent and cannot be permitted under
the Constitution.
189. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 44.
190. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997). The Court stated:
When the political branches of the Government act against the background of a
judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood
that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the
respect due them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary
expectations must be disappointed.
Id.




Freedom of religion is a fundamental right in the United
States.' 92 Religious freedom was one of the motivating factors
that led English dissenters to the New World.1  Since the
founding of the United States, Congress and the courts have
continuously striven to uphold this right.19' A unique problem
has arisen, however, when religious freedom is asserted in the
context of correctional institutions. While courts have established
that prisoners do retain the right to religious freedom, courts have
also maintained that this right may be curtailed. The struggle to
balance these two conflicting principles led courts to apply a wide
variety of standards to inmate claims. The Supreme Court's last
word on the subject occurred in the O'Lone case in 1987.'1 The
Supreme Court recognized the special problems that prison officials
face and held that prison regulations infringing on the free exercise
of religion should be subject to a rational basis analysis."9
Congress did not agree with this decision and enacted RFRA,
effectively overruling O'Lone, in 1993. The legislative history
reveals, however, that Congress still intended for the courts to give
prison officials a certain amount of discretion."9  In fact, the
Judiciary Committee's report explicitly states that deference is to
be given to prison officials. 9
The narrower definition of "substantial burden" is more
faithful to the legislative history. This definition requires a
demonstration that prison policies have either (1) mandated
conduct one's religion forbids; or (2) prohibited conduct one's
religion requires.' 99 The narrower definition will make it easier
for judges to dismiss frivolous inmate claims while allowing worthy
claims to be upheld. It will also provide prison officials with a
certain degree of flexibility to implement regulations that further
legitimate penological objectives.
192. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
193. See ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 2.
194. See id
195. See O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 342.
196. See id. at 353.
197. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 44 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892.
198. See id.
199. See supra Part V.A.
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The broader definition of "substantial burden," which only
requires an inmate to show that conduct is "important" to one's
religious beliefs,/ is inconsistent with the legislative history. The
broader definition gives deference to inmates by allowing the
threshold requirement to be met by merely stating that something
is "religiously motivated." Thus, judges will not be able to dismiss
frivolous claims, and the government will have to spend time and
money defending these suits.
Recently, the Supreme Court held that Congress exceeded its
constitutional powers when it enacted RFRA.21  This has not,
however, solved the problem of defining substantial burden. Many
states have already passed or are in the process of passing state
religious freedom laws identical to RFRA.' Thus, state courts
will struggle with which definition to apply in the prison context.
State judges must recognize that the application of a broad
definition of substantial burden, under RFRA, produced adverse
consequences. Therefore, state judges should choose to apply a
narrow definition of substantial burden when ruling on allegations
of religious infringement in correctional institutions.
Prisoners definitely retain constitutional protections under the
First Amendment. 3  Indeed, the First Amendment does not
discriminate. Yet, courts must recognize that prisoners are
different from individuals in free society. Society intends to punish
those who have committed crimes through prison sentences, and
regulations are necessary to allow the prison system to operate
efficiently. The narrower definition of substantial burden allows
prisoners to practice sincere and required religious beliefs while
upholding the requirements of the criminal justice system.
Sara Anderson Frey
200. See supra Part IV.A.
201. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1987).
202. See supra note 184.
203. See supra Part II.C.
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